Sunday, October 11, 2009

Contracts, walk in Riverfront park, Contracts

Part I: Contracts

A contract is a promise. Or a contract is an enforceable promise. Or a contract is a promise for which the law assigns a duty. If there's a duty there's a right. If there's a violation of a right, there is a remedy. Or a contract is a promise plus consideration. Or some combination of the above. I have eight more weeks to hash out the details.

Part II: walk in Riverfront (park?)

Joey and I tried to find the "other" off leash dog park, which is supposed to be part of the Riverfront Park, which is supposed to be by the river. As far as I know, it is by the river, but I'm pretty sure that if that's the case it's the side of the river I didn't explore last week. If that makes any sense at all. Joey and I trespassed, I think, into the driveway/dominion of the persons who operate the dam to park the car, then hiked up into the trees along the river and found a path. No one was around, so I took off his leash. The path merged onto what was obviously a maintained walking trail and I put his leash back on. We had a good time; it was a nice break from the sidewalks and pedestrians that are the backdrop of our daily walks. There were little inlets to the river here and there with bridges built over them - narrow bridges of which Joey was highly suspicious. Watching him cross the first one was hilarious: feet spread in all four directions, head low, moving one step at a time in a low crouch and sprinting the last foot to "safety." He was still cautious by the time we crossed the third one, but it didn't take five minutes.

To our mutual surprise, the path opened up on the parking area around the KU boat house, which is large, and was apparently hosting some kind of rowing event. There were vessels in the river, coaches in little motor boats shouting through megaphones, spectators on the shore. Joey mingled with some admirers, then we walked up the gravel road that apparently gives boaters access to the facility. It was coated in fallen leaves and hedged in big pretty trees wreathed in climbing vines. The leaves on the vines were varying colors, so that some of the trees were sheathed in red, others in gold, some still in pale green. It gave them this beautiful blurry look and made me wish I had my camera.

An hour and a half later, Joey and I arrived home, and I sat back down at my desk to stare down at my Contracts casebook.

Part III: Contracts

Parties form a contract if there is consideration upon a promise. Consideration is benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promissee. But sometimes reliance upon the promise on the part of the promissee suffices. And sometimes a judge just doesn't want to enforce a promise. And sometimes a judge does. And watch what you promise a nonprofit, because they can enforce just about anything. I think.

Thursday, October 1, 2009

Sorry about September

Somehow September never afforded time for blog postings...or at least, in the month of September I didn't make time for blog postings. Which, as my angriest fan and most beloved sister Amanda has informed me, was unacceptable.

Here is what I have to blog about:

Yesterday I was the defense attorney for KU's Traffic Court of Appeals, meaning I represented two persons who received tickets they believed to be unwarranted. At KU, rather than immediately pay your ticket, you may within 10 business days appeal the ticket for a hearing in front of KU's Kansas Senate endorsed Traffic Court. First year students apply to be attorneys, and are assigned cases. Second and third year students function as justices, deciding ex parte cases and hearing argued cases.

Two weeks ago I received my assignment; I met with my clients, corresponded with opposing council, collected evidence (supporting facts, photographs of the site of the citation, supporting testimonies) and presented my two cases before the court last night. The trials follow normal court procedure very closely, with the defense attorney (me!) stating the case, entering the appellant's appearance, and calling witnesses. Following witness testimony, attorneys give closing statements, arguing the facts and the supporting evidence entered into the court, with some counterargument of the opposing side's stated case.

Glossing over some of the details that may fall under attorney client privilege (not sure, but good to be safe...) I will share what is a matter of public record:

Delma Hepner, a retiree of the University who worked for KU for over twenty years and now volunteers at the Spencer Art Museum, received a citation for parking in a lane that exists in front of the museum and includes one handicapped parking space. According to Ms. Hepner and other faculty of the museum, including its Assistant Director Carolyn Lewis, this area is commonly used as short term parking and a loading/unloading zone, as long as parked cars are not obstructing the flow of traffic through the lane or making the handicapped space inaccessible. Previous en banc decisions of the traffic court (decisions reached by the entire body of judges instead of a panel of three) serve as precedent, and a 1978 case held that in the case there are ambiguous situations which may mislead persons as to appropriate parking, it is the university's responsibility to clear them up.

Opposing council argued that the lack of perpendicular lines should have alerted Ms. Hepner to the fact that the space was undesignated. Further, prosecution contended that Ms. Hepner had not sought reasonable authority before concluding that parking in that space was appropriate. (i.e., that the Assistant Director of the museum, not a member of parking services staff, was not sufficiently authoritative to be depended upon in parking matters)

Precedent case for the prosecution was the decision of University v. Carberry, held that a person who claimed parking in a space was "common practice" and that therefore the appellant's mistake was reasonable, was errononeous. Incorrect usage of parking spaces does not "ripen" into a license to illegally park.

After deliberation, a 2-1 decision of the court was to relieve Ms. Hepner of her citation.

Next case, University v. Mellor -
Mr. Mellor woke up ill on the morning in question with severe abdominal pain. He rushed himself to Watkins Health Center and upon arrival, found that he had only a few pieces of change for the metered parking in front of the clinic. Not a university permit holder, Mr. Mellor was left with no other options for parking beyond driving around the block to park off campus. Because of his painful and panicked state, he just fed the change he had found into the meter and rushed into the clinic, where he was examined, diagnosed with kidney stones, and subsequently treated in a manner that involved being confined to a bed on fluids for the four hour duration of his stay. Upon release, Mr. Mellor discovered he had received two parking citations for parking in an expired metered parking space.

The University policy on these particular metered parking stalls in front of Watkins Health Center is that, should a person prove they were admitted to Watkins Health Center an hour or more before receiving the first citation, they are to be released from the ticket. The meters in this location are one hour maximum meters, which means they max out after a person pays for an hour of time. Mr. Mellor did not pay for an hour of time in the space and the first citation was entered twenty minutes after he checked in to Watkins.

Defense (me!) argued that Mr. Mellor was in a state of severe pain, a condition that constituted an emergency visit and admission to Watkins Health Center. He made a good faith effort to pay the meter with the change he had available. Gauging the reasonableness of his efforts, it's important to apply a standard of reasonable behavior that is adjusted by the severity of his pain and his condition, a condition which led doctors to keep him at the Center for four hours for treatment. He was unable to leave during that time to move the car. Citing University v. George, defense pointed out that the court has held that the University shall not prioritize adherence to parking regulations over the health of a student, especially one suffering from a condition that can reasonably be said to impair their ability to proactively secure change before leaving their house for the hospital.

Prosecution countered that the rule clearly states its terms, and that the George case involves a person who had made an appointment with Watkins and found no parking, metered or permitted, in the lot upon arrival. George parked in a handicapped space because of insufficient spaces. Mellor, however, had available metered parking which he failed to appropriately pay for.

Following deliberation, a 2-1 decision of the court relieved Mr. Mellor of his citation.

If you got through all that, great. If you didn't, what it all boils down to - I WON! Twice.